This paper describes a mechanism of ethnic con ‡ict and cooperation, in which the fear of indiscriminate vengeance induces mutual monitoring within the target group of communal violence. In our peer monitoring equilibrium, in-group policing and out-group con ‡ict coexist, and the former is developed by the latter in order to suppress inter-ethnic transgressions. Our theory is in contrast to Fearon and Laitin's (1996) theory of inter-ethnic cooperation which shows no theoretical linkage between the two forms of punishments. Using a social matching game with costly monitoring, we predict that the success of inter-ethnic cooperation hinges heavily on each group's quality of in-group policing and that as a consequence, a group with lower quality of policing tends to have more frequent and longer disputes with other groups. Other comparative-statics analyses will also be discussed.
Introduction
In their seminal paper of inter-ethnic cooperation, Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that one of the di¢ culties for sustaining cooperation between two ethnic groups lies in lack of information, especially in the identi…cation problem about who misbehaved. 1 According to their spiral equilibrium, because people in a group cannot identify a transgressor in the other group, inter-ethnic cooperation can be enforced only by punishing all the suspects, and an individual transgression leads to large-scale ethnic violence. 2 Acknowledgements to be added. 1 In their words, "[a]t bottom, the problem is informational." 2 Similarly, Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) considered cooperation by community enforcement in an economy where each player does not have any information about interactions in which he is not involved (i.e., information is atomized). In their contagious equilibrium, cooperation is sustained by a series of vicarious punishments, which result in total breakdown of cooperation.
Although such a problem of individual identi…cation should not be ignored, however, evidences from anthropology indicate that an inter-ethnic transgression triggers con ‡ict for another reason. Precisely, it is reported from anarchic or weak-state societies that inter-ethnic con ‡ict is sparked o¤ for inducing each ethnic group to discipline its own transgressors. Under the threat of con ‡ict, because people were scared of group-level violence, they were motivated for controlling their brethren not to misbehave against ethnic strangers. In other words, collective violence creates peer pressure or peer punishment in the target group that contributes to social orders in the larger population.
For example, Wilson (1983) reported that among Nyakyusa in Tanzania, a single across-village wrongdoing led to communal violence.
In a case of adultery the injured husband, together with his kinsmen, pursued and attempted to kill, or torture and kill, the adulterer: self-help was not only permitted but expected in this situation, and a man's near kinsmen were obliged to assist him. Neighbours were not obliged to assist in executing vengeance, but they might be victims of it, for if the injured husband did not …nd the adulterer he might kill any village-mate of his enemy. Such an attack commonly led to war between the two villages (pp.149).
This event seems to exactly match Fearon and Laitin's spiral equilibrium. However, this is not the end of the story. Because a wrongdoer was a potential danger to his neighbours, he was expected to leave his village in order to avoid the war: "thieves and adulterers were liable to be banished from a village just like witches and sorcerers, for they too brought misfortune on their fellows" (pp.150). It implies that communal violence between villages induced social ostracism of the wrongdoer from his village.
In addition, from medieval Iceland, it was reported by Miller (1990) that if a person was wronged by a stranger, the object of revenge did not have to be the actual wrongdoer; he simply had to be, in the avenger's estimation, someone associated with the wrongdoer. The avenger could kill just any random person who was as distant as …rst cousins. "From a functional point of view, [the fact that the avenger's victim need not be the actual wrongdoer] had the e¤ect of inducing people who might be held accountable for each other's actions to involve themselves in each other's a¤airs" (pp.197). As a consequence, "[g]roup liability, it could be argued, thus rendered the feud or fear of feud much more e¤ective as an instrument of social control than it would otherwise have been if only the actual wrongdoer su¤ered the consequences of his actions" (pp.198). In other words, by collectively targeting the wrongdoer and his relatives ex ante, groups could create stronger internal controls which would be impossible by targeting just the wrongdoer. Other examples of such indiscriminate vengeance are reported from North America (Reid 1999:92-3) , Corsica Island (Gould 1999 ) and Alaska (Colson 1974:41) . 3 These reports suggest that communal violence may happen between groups in order to create in-group punishments on transgressors. People may employ such indiscriminate vengeance, because there are two reasons that "group-level sanctions may be expected to outperform individual-level ones" (Levinson 2003:373) . First, collective punishment may induce mutual in-group monitoring which can be much cheaper and more e¤ective than monitoring from outside, and in-group monitoring may help to reduce misbehaviors. Peers are in a better position for monitoring coethnics than ethnic strangers, but such monitoring can be further strengthened by threats from outside. Second, because of the tight social connectedness in an ethnic group, peer punishment induced by external collective punishment can also be cheaper and more e¤ective than outsiders'individual punishment. Peers can impose various kinds of penalties on those who misbehave. For example, just peers' social ostracism or boycott of business can be su¢ cient to discourage opportunistic transgressions. On the other hand, it is likely to be more di¢ cult and costly for outside punishers to e¤ectively threaten individual wrongdoers in a group because of the weak social tie between them. In short, peers are advantageous both in monitoring and in punishing than outside entities. 4 The above argument was not formally explained by the model of Fearon and Laitin (1996) , who described two equilibria of in-group policing and of out-group con ‡icts with no theoretical linkage between the two forms of punishments. Thus, in this paper, we extend their model of inter-ethnic cooperation in a way that in-group policing and out-group con ‡ict coexist and the former is induced under the threat of the latter. Namely, we provide a model of social matching game in which people within each ethnic group costly and imperfectly monitor peers'behaviors. Our model is in contrast to Fearon and Laitin's (1996) model in which full information of peers' behaviors is assumed within each ethnic group. Moreover, in order to investigate the mechanism of inter-ethnic cooperation without centralized institutional arrangements, we develop the model in the following two dimensions: i) there is cultural disparity between groups which generates a possibility of misinterpreting actions of members in another group; ii) in the presence of such "noise", each group has a degree of tolerance allowing for ethnic stranger's observed misbehaviors as misinterpretation.
Main results are as follows. 1) Inter-ethnic cooperation may require enforcements both by in-group policing and by out-group con ‡ict, and the former punishment is developed by the latter.
2) The success of inter-ethnic cooperation hinges heavily on each group's quality of in-group policing. As a consequence, groups with high qualities 3 Among them, Colson (1974:41) reported of the Eskimo around Point Barrow, the fear of feud "in ‡uenced Eskimo behavior and encouraged the suppression of behavior that could lead to violence." 4 These points are also noted by Hardin (1995:118-9) . "First, groups are apt to have better information about their members'actions than about the actions of people in other groups. Second, groups are apt to have fairly straightforward reasons for imposing order on their own members if they are to be held responsible for their fellow members'actions." of in-group policing can successfully maintain long-lasting peace and cooperation, whereas those with low qualities of policing tend to have more frequent and longer disputes with other groups. 3) A dense network between groups may provoke ethnic con ‡ict if two groups are culturally disparate, whereas it can facilitate cooperation between culturally close groups. 4) As a group tolerates observed misbehaviors by members in the other group and refrains from con ‡ict, the risk of ethnic con ‡ict can be reduced, but such tolerance may ignite inter-ethnic transgressions if the target group's internal punishment is insu¢ cient. In short, inter-ethnic tolerance does not necessarily encourage inter-ethnic cooperation, depending on each group's quality of internal punishment. 5) In-group policing equilibrium and spiral one presented by Fearon and Laitin are two extreme cases of our 'peer punishment equilibrium'. The former corresponds to ours with strong in-group punishment, in which interethnic relation is characterized by mutual trust, while the latter corresponds to ours with weak punishment, characterized by mutual mistrust. We will describe evidence consistent with these results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of interethnic cooperation. Section 3 considers equilibria with and without peer monitoring. Section 4 demonstrates the necessity of peer monitoring in the presence of noise. Section 5 analyzes comparative statics, which is the highlight of this paper. Section 6 concludes.
Model of Inter-Ethnic Cooperation

Social Matching Game
This section provides a model of inter-ethnic cooperation. The model employs a social matching game. Suppose that there are two ethnic groups A and B, each of which consists of n individuals. These groups are represented by sets A = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and B = fn + 1; n + 2; : : : ; 2ng; where each individual is indexed by i. 5 All the individuals are homogeneous in actions they take and payo¤s they obtain. In successive periods t = 1; 2; : : :, each individual i is randomly matched with an opponent and plays the stage game of prisoner's dilemma, in which each individual simultaneously and independently selects to cooperate or to defect a i;t 2 fC; Dg. One can imagine that people roam around a market, encounter one another and trade goods or services. The action of cooperation means to ful…ll duties as they agreed, while the action of defection denotes any sort of opportunistic behaviors such as cheat, fraud, steal, robbery or malfeasance.
Cooperate Defect Cooperate 1; 1 ; Defect ; 0; 0 In each period, k individuals in each group are paired with members in the other group ("outsiders") while the remaining n k are paired among themselves ("peers"). p = k=n is a fraction of members in a group who interact across groups in each period, and it denotes the density of the network between groups. It is assumed that k < n=2 -thus, p < 1=2 -so that interactions within a group ("in-group matches") are more frequent than interactions across groups ("out-group matches"). 6 In the stage game, if both individuals successfully cooperate with each other, they obtain payo¤ of one. But, one may be tempted to defect against the other for obtaining payo¤ of > 1; while payo¤ to a cheated individual is < 0. Payo¤ from mutual defection is normalized to be zero. As a consequence, the dominant action in the stage game is to defect, and this payo¤ structure (Table 1 ) makes the mutual cooperation di¢ cult. Payo¤s in the future periods are discounted by a common discount factor 2 (0; 1) : Each individual i selects a i;t 2 fC; Dg to maximize his own payo¤.
Information
An ethnic group often has a dense social network which enables to spread information among its members through rumors or gossips. Thus, information about an individual's behavior can be easily shared among his peers, whereas such information is less likely to be transmitted beyond the ethnic border or to be shared by outsiders due to the relative infrequency of interactions or the di¤erence in social manners or languages. The structure of information in this two-sided social matching game can be characterized by the di¤erence of di¢ culties in intra-versus inter-group transmission of information. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that information transmission within a group is easier and quicker than between groups, but in order to make the analysis tractable, we will adopt simpler assumptions as follows.
For in-group interactions, actions and identities of all the members in a group are assumed to be perfectly observed by all of them. Also, an individual's history of play is perfectly known by his peers. However, information about in-group interactions in a group is totally unobservable and unknown to members in the other group. In other words, information about in-group interactions is local in the sense that what happened within a group is known to everyone in the group, but unknown to others.
For out-group interactions, all pairs of actions are perfectly observed by members Table 2 : The assumptions on information in the view of members in group A. The assumption on the part with asterisk (*) will be modi…ed later. Information obtained by members in group B follows in the same manner.
of both groups. However, no one knows the identity about who defected. One can imagine that once a crime happens, it will be reported by newspapers or local media and then quickly become public information, but people cannot tell who committed the crime. The assumptions on information are summarized in Table 2 .
3 Inter-Ethnic Cooperation Enforced by In-Group Policing
Di¢ culties of Cooperation in the Large Population
In this social matching game, there are multiple equilibria if the discount factor is su¢ ciently large, but this section …rst picks up three representative equilibria. They can be distinguished in terms of population joining cooperation: no cooperation 0 , only in-group cooperation 1 , and both in-and out-group cooperation 2 . These three equilibria will be compared in terms of payo¤s and conditions on parameters. We adopt Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as a solution concept. We consider the following equilibria.
0. Equilibrium of no cooperation. All individuals adopt the strategy 0 ; which is to play D for any pairing.
1. Equilibrium of in-group cooperation. All individuals adopt the following strategy 1 . For in-group pairings, play C with any individual of the normal phase, and play D against any individual of the punishment phase, regardless of one's own status. An individual enters (or restarts) the punishment phase of T in periods if he defects against a peer of the normal phase. An individual who is not in the punishment phase is in the normal phase. For out-group pairings, always play D. The game starts with the normal phase. 2. Spiral equilibrium (Fearon and Laitin 1996) . All individuals take the following strategy 2 . For in-group pairings, play in the same way as in 1 . For out-group pairings, play C during the peace phase, while play D during the con ‡ict phase. Groups go to the con ‡ict phase of T out periods if any individual defects in an out-group pairing during the peace phase. When groups are not in the con ‡ict phase, it is in the peace phase. The game starts with the normal/peace phase.
In 0 , no cooperation occurs in any interaction. In 1 , people cooperate only within each group, and those who defected will be punished by their peers. People further cooperate with outsiders in 2 , where the ethnic con ‡ict is triggered by a single defection against an outsider. The conditions for equilibria are as follows. ;
For the strategy pro…le of 2 to constitute a SPNE, it is required, in addition to conditions for 1 ; that
For both 1 and 2 with 1 + , if it is a SPNE for given parameters, then it is always possible to take T in = 1.
All the proofs appear in the Appendix.
Inequalities in 1 shows the condition for in-group cooperation. Inequality (1) shows that the threat of ethnic con ‡ict, which causes the expected loss of
p, is e¤ective enough to discourage an out-group defection, which brings the immediate gain of 1. Lemma 1 con…rms that cooperation in the larger population will be more di¢ cult to sustain as predicted by theories of the collective action (e.g., Olson 1965; Taylor 1982:53) , even though cooperation with more persons is more bene…cial in the model. (The per-period expected payo¤s from 0 , 1 and 2 are 0, 1 p and 1, respectively.) No constraint is assigned on 0 , because every individual takes the dominant action of the stage game. The condition on 1 implies that the network within a group (represented by 1 p) must be dense enough that peer punishment is e¤ective to deter transgressions. The equilibrium 2 requires, in addition to the condition on 1 , that the social connectedness between groups p be so tight that the threat of group-level con ‡ict e¤ectively discourages out-group transgressions. The di¢ culty of large cooperation, according to the theory, owes to the infrequency of interactions and the insu¢ ciency of information.
For cases with 1 + , the condition for in-group cooperation will be more relaxed if the length of punishment is shorter, because those who are being punished may refuse to conform if the length is so long. 8 
I T
in > 1 denotes the indicator function which gives one if T in > 1 and zero otherwise.
Peer Monitoring and Peer Punishment
Lemma 1 has shown that if the network between groups p is not dense enough, the spiral equilibrium cannot enforce inter-ethnic cooperation. In order to further support cooperation between groups, we consider two forms of peer punishments to supplement the strategy 2 of the spiral equilibrium. The …rst form of peer punishment is collective and imposed on all the members who are suspected to have defected. If a defection against an outsider happens in a period, those who interacted with outsiders in that period should be the suspects, and one of them should really have defected. The following strategy pro…le describes such a punishment.
3. Equilibrium of collective peer punishment. All individuals adopt the strategy 3 speci…ed as follows. For in-group pairings, play in the same way as in 1 except that an individual enters the punishment phase if he defects against a peer of the normal phase, or if at least one member in his group defects in out-group pairing when he matches with an outsider during the peace phase. (When a defection against an outsider occurs, all the individuals who matched with outsiders in that period will enter the punishment phase.) For out-group pairings, play in the same way as in 2 . (What triggers the con ‡ict phase is also the same as in 2 .)
In 3 , inter-ethnic cooperation is sustained both by peer punishment and by ethnic con ‡ict.
Lemma 2
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for 3 to form a SPNE is the same as in 2 except that Inequality (1) is replaced by
(2) For 1 + , T in can be chosen to be one if the strategy pro…le is a SPNE.
The di¤erence of 3 from the spiral equilibrium 2 is that in 3 , inter-group cooperation relies not only on the threat of con ‡ict, but also on collective peer punishment. As a result, it can sustain cooperation between groups which is impossible in the spiral equilibrium. If people in a group impose peer punishment on all the suspected members, severer punishments than in 2 are possible despite the anonymity of defectors.
The second form of peer punishment is individual rather than collective. However, individual punishment is impossible unless a defector is identi…ed. Therefore, we modify the assumption on information as follows.
Before starting the social matching game (at t = 0), each ethnic group I 2 fA; Bg simultaneously determines the e¤ort level m I for monitoring its members and assigns per-period cost m I to every group member. Through this costly investigation, those who defected in out-group interactions will be detected by all the peers with probability r (m I ) at the beginning of the next period, where r ( ) is a monotonically increasing function with properties r (0) = 0, r 0 (m) > 0 and r ( ) 2 (0; 1) for m > 0. Given a strategy pro…le of the social matching game, each group I is assumed to maximize the payo¤ of a representative (homogeneous) member in the group by selecting m I . 9 For simplicity, let us further set the following assumptions on monitoring. The cost m I is considered to be a membership tax and cannot be rejected by members.
(Those who evade paying taxes will be excluded from the group.) 10 Once m I is determined, the probability r (m I ) is known to all the members in group I (but, not to anyone in the other group), and m I cannot be changed in the midst of the game. If a group fails to identify who defected in the period, they can never be identi…ed for all the future periods. If a member who defected is identi…ed, it becomes common knowledge (only) within the group.
By this change in assumption on information, the part with asterisk (*) in Table 2 is modi…ed such that identities in out-group interactions are imperfectly detected with probability r (m I ). The payo¤ of individual i in group I at a period is equal to the payo¤ from the prisoner's dilemma minus the cost for monitoring m I : One may wonder why a group has incentives to monitor its members, although it is costly. Under the threat of ethnic con ‡ict, people are willing not only to cooperate with outsiders, but also to control opportunistic behaviors by their ethnic brethren. Without such ingroup control, someone may harm outsiders, and then everyone in the group would be penalized. In order to control others in an e¤ective way, a group may introduce monitoring to induce conformity by peers.
Here, we do not specify the process of determining the e¤ort level of peer monitoring within a group. It may be determined by a benevolent group leader. Or, it may be by majority rule. Neither do we specify how peer monitoring is implemented or how information is correctly shared by peers. For the time being, we simply treat a group as a decisionmaking body for the level of peer monitoring and assume that the result of monitoring is common knowledge within a group. The issue of monitoring process will be discussed in the section of conclusion.
By using peer monitoring, we introduce a strategy pro…le with individual peer punishment.
4. Peer monitoring equilibrium: All individuals take the strategy 4 speci…ed as follows. For in-group pairings, play in the same way as in 1 except that an individual enters the punishment phase by defecting a peer of the normal phase, or by being identi…ed to have defected (with a probability determined by costly monitoring) in out-group pairings during the peace phase. For out-group pairings, play in the same way as in 2 . The monitoring cost m I for each group I is determined as the minimum level m which satis…es Inequality (3) below.
In contrast to 3 , peer punishment in 4 is imposed on a particular individual who defected in the previous period. If a group fails to identify who defected, peer punishment will not be imposed on anyone. ; I (T in > 1)
For 1 + , T in can be chosen to be one if the strategy pro…le is a SPNE.
Proposition 1 gives an important implication; inter-ethnic cooperation of 4 is possible only if each group can e¤ectively police its members within a limited cost of monitoring. If the cost (m ) exceeds the bene…t from inter-ethnic cooperation (p), the group refrains from cooperating with outsiders. Thus, an ethnic group which lacks the means of e¢ ciently disciplining its members fails to cooperate with other ethnic groups. Such a case with very ine¢ cient monitoring leads to the strategy pro…le 1 .
On the other hand, this equilibrium of 4 appears problematic for two reasons. First, from Inequality (3), it follows that m falls in T out ; implying that as ethnic con ‡ict becomes longer, its threat becomes more e¤ective, so that the required level of monitoring falls. Thus, the optimal equilibrium involves very long periods of con ‡ict (T out ! 1). This optimality of very large T out comes from the fact that the ethnic con ‡ict never occurs on the equilibrium path.
Second, in comparison with Lemma 1, Proposition 1 says that the condition for the peer monitoring equilibrium is weaker than that for the spiral equilibrium in the sense that monitoring is employed (m > 0) as a remedy for recovering incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. However, in comparison with Lemma 2, it might be possible to sustain cooperation even without costly monitoring if collective peer punishment is introduced. In addition, if m > 0, the expected payo¤ from the peer monitoring equilibrium, which is 1 m , is strictly lower than that from the equilibrium of collective peer punishment, which is one. It is because in an idealistic world without noise, any sort of punishment is never realized on the equilibrium path; peer monitoring simply causes ine¢ ciency.
To address these two problems, so we consider cases with noisy interactions in the next section. As analyzed in the next section, the result drastically changes once a possibility of misinterpretation in actions (noise) is introduced. In the presence of noise, groups may want to pay costs for monitoring in order to reduce the risk of ethnic con ‡ict and/or to make its length shorter.
4 In-Group Policing Developed by Out-Group Con‡ict
The Game with Noisy Interactions
This section develops the model for more plausible cases with noisy interactions, in which, with a small probability ", a person's cooperative behavior is mistakenly interpreted as a "defection" by ethnic strangers. As pointed out by sociologists (e.g., Hechter 1987:178), misinterpretation of actions may be caused by cultural di¤erence between groups, and it is more likely if the di¤erence is larger. Thus, the probability " shows how culturally di¤erent two groups are. Another interpretation of noise would be the reduced version of more plausible assumption that in each group, there are a very small number of players of bad "type" who occasionally damage ethnic strangers regardless of the severity of punishment. We avoid the complexity of incorporating such a type, but this section takes such a possibility into account. As shown later, this small probability of misinterpretation makes inter-ethnic cooperation more di¢ cult. Precisely, the assumption on out-group interactions is modi…ed as follows.
A cooperative action by member i in group I in out-group interaction is occasionally perceived as a defection by members in the other group J 6 = I with a small probability ". Such an accident of misinterpretation happens independently from any other accidents of misinterpretation. As a consequence, given that individual i chooses to cooperate, the opponent's cooperation gives individual i the payo¤ of one with probability 1 " and of with probability ". Similarly, given that individual i defects, the opponent's cooperation gives individual i the payo¤ of with probability 1 " and of zero with probability ". The ex ante payo¤ of the stage game with noise is summarized in Table 3 .
In the case of accident that i's cooperation is misinterpreted by outsiders, it is also misinterpreted by the rest of members in I until it is costly investigated through peer monitoring. By peer monitoring, the identity of who intentionally defected is revealed with probability r (m I ), and this result of peer monitoring is shared by all Cooperate Defect Cooperate (1 ") " ; (1 ") "
; (1 ") Defect
(1 ") ; 0; 0 
Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in Noisy Interactions
Given such misinterpretation of actions, we will modify the strategy pro…les with inter-ethnic cooperation 2 ; 3 and 4 in two ways. First, the length of peer punishment is set to be one (T in = 1), which is always possible for 1 + if a strategy pro…le is a SPNE. The purpose of this restriction is to make the analysis tractable and to reduce the damage of collective peer punishment.
Second, each group allows for some defections by outsiders in a period as unavoidable "noise." Due to the presence of misinterpretation, each group ignores a certain amount of observed out-group defections in order to reduce the likelihood of ethnic con ‡ict, and ethnic groups refrain from con ‡ict as long as the amount of defections is negligible such that the number of defections (henceforth #D I ) in either group I against outsiders in a period does not exceed a cuto¤ level Q. 11 The parameter Q denotes the propensity to preserve peace or "tolerance" which is larger if groups are more concessive toward each other and smaller if they are more confrontational. For simplicity, we assume that two groups have the same level of Q.
The equilibria modi…ed from 2 ; 3 and 4 follow.
5. Spiral equilibrium (modi…ed). All the individuals adopt the following strategy 5 . For in-group pairings, play in the same way as in 2 . The length of in-group punishment is one (T in = 1). For out-group pairings, play as in 2 except that groups enter the con ‡ict phase if at least Q + 1 members in either group are perceived, by the other group, to have defected. 12 6. Equilibrium of collective peer punishment (modi…ed). All the individuals adopt the following strategy 6 . For in-group pairings, play in the same way as in 3
except that an individual enters the punishment phase if he defects against a peer of the normal phase, or if at least Q + 1 members in his group defect in out-group pairings when he matches with an outsider during the peace phase.
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For out-group pairings, play as in 5 .
For simplicity, we use the same degree of tolerance Q as a cuto¤ level of collective peer punishment in 6 .
7. Peer monitoring equilibrium (modi…ed). All the individuals adopt the following strategy 7 . For in-group pairings, play as in 4 except that an individual enters the punishment phase by defecting a peer of the normal phase, or by being revealed to have intentionally defected against outsider during the peace phase. For out-group pairings, play as in 5 . The monitoring cost m I for each group I is determined as the minimum level m which satis…es Inequality (4) below.
Before presenting equilibrium conditions, it may be convenient to show some properties of the random variable #D I . Because there are k out-group interactions in a period and a misinterpretation happens with probability ", the random variable #D I follows a binomial distribution during the peace phase; i.e., #D I B(k; "). Let F k (Q) be the cumulative distribution function of #D I less than or equal to Q observed defections among k interactions.
where
. Then, F k (Q) equals the probability that a group does not trigger ethnic con ‡ict in a period, and therefore the square of F k (Q) equals the probability that the peace phase continues to the next period. If a player intentionally deviates, the probability to preserve peace declines to
Equilibrium condition for 7 is the following. (Conditions for 5 and 6 appear in the Appendix.) Proposition 2 The strategy pro…le 7 is a SPNE if and only if p <
1+
; (1 p) (1 + ) maxf 1; g; and there exists m V out such that
denotes the per-period ex ante expected payo¤ from out-group interactions.
The interpretation of the above conditions is immediate. While the term (1 ") ( 1) " in the right-hand side (RHS) of Inequality (4) denotes the gain from intentional deviation, the term in the left-hand side (LHS) shows the change in the expected loss caused by it. So, the condition says that the expected losses by punishment must be large enough to discourage opportunistic deviations.
According to this equilibrium, minor misconducts between ethnic groups could unexpectedly destroy the inter-ethnic norm, and group-based reprisals may follow, involving a large portion of people who seemed to have kept peaceful relations for a long time. This sudden fall of inter-ethnic norm may explain ferocious events such as the communal violence between Christian Copts and Muslims in southern Egypt in 2000. 14 
Superiority of Peer Monitoring Equilibrium
In the next step, we will investigate how the presence of small noise in ‡uences these equilibrium outcomes. For three di¤erent levels of noises, Table 4 gives per-period ex ante expected payo¤s V 5 ; V 6 and V 7 of three equilibria 5 ; 6 and 7 , respectively. (Formulas for V 5 ; V 6 and V 7 appear in the Appendix.) For the peer monitoring equilibrium 7 , three cases with di¤erent e¢ ciencies of peer monitoring are analyzed in the table. Table 4 shows that although all three strategy pro…les can be sustained as SPNE in cases without noise (" = 0) with the given parameter values, results drastically change once noise (" > 0) is introduced. As noise rises to " = :01, the spiral equilibrium, which has the weakest punishment device among three strategy pro…les, …rst becomes impossible to sustain regardless of Q.
For the equilibrium of collective peer punishment 6 , although it can achieve SPNE for any levels of noise (" = :001; :01 or :05) it is not possible to form SPNE with large degrees of tolerance Q. (For example, with " = :01, Q > 3 destroys the equilibrium condition of 6 .) It is because a su¢ ciently large degree of tolerance makes both peer and external punishments less likely and less e¤ective. Knowing that an amount of 14 Dumont (1982:222) reported from the Ottoman Empire that con ‡icts were caused simply by mistrust between ethnic groups. "Whenever a young Christian disappeared at the approach of Passover, Jews were immediately accused of having kidnapped him to obtain blood necessary for the manufacture of unleavened bread. Threats and violence followed close behind the suspicions and generally things ended with a boycott of Jewish shops and peddlers." 
1=10
; for which larger c implies more e¢ cient monitoring. A dash denotes that the strategy pro…le cannot be sustained as a SPNE.
defections are recognized as mistakes and ignored, an individual correctly expects that the probability that his deliberate defection triggers punishment is negligible, and his willingness to conform will be eroded. Moreover, low ex ante payo¤s V 6 with a large amount of noise makes inter-ethnic cooperation by collective peer punishment ( 6 ) incredible. For example, in a case with " = :05, due to the presence of noise, groups may su¤er from frequent peer punishment. If ex ante payo¤ is below 1 p, inter-ethnic cooperation is not worthwhile since in-group cooperation of 2 guarantees payo¤ of 1 p. In short, spiral equilibrium and equilibrium of collective peer punishment tend to be destroyed as the noise grows.
In contrast, if each group can e¢ ciently monitor its members (e.g., c = :2), the peer monitoring equilibrium 7 can form a SPNE even with large Q and large " as shown in Table 4 . Moreover, it can achieve higher ex ante payo¤s than the equilibrium of collective peer punishment 6 . These results indicate that the selection of collective punishment and individual one depends on the e¢ ciency of peer monitoring. If a group can monitor its members in a cheap way, the peer monitoring equilibrium is more payo¤-enhancing and more robust to noise than the equilibrium with collective peer punishment. These results suggest that collective punishment by peers is unlikely to occur in the presence of noise.
Comparative Statics
This section analyzes comparative statics. Because it is already discussed that equilibria without peer monitoring are unlikely in cases with noise, we con…ne attention to the peer monitoring equilibrium 7 . So far, we have treated Q as exogenously given and paid attention to the Pareto optimal equilibrium among equilibria with various levels of Q. Trivially, such an equilibrium survives even if each group endogenously chooses its tolerance toward the other group simultaneously and independently after observing m A and m B .
15 Therefore, we continue to treat Q as exogenous and regard the Pareto optimal equilibrium as the most plausible outcome.
E¢ ciency of Peer Monitoring and Tolerance Toward Ethnic Strangers
The …rst observation is that tolerance can either support or harm inter-ethnic cooperation, depending on the e¢ ciency of monitoring. It is trivial that the cumulative distribution function F k (Q) increases in the cuto¤ level of con ‡ict Q. In other words, as long as equilibrium condition in Proposition 2 is satis…ed, ethnic con ‡ict is less likely between groups with higher tolerances. The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 There exists a SPNE 7 with large Q < k if, in addition to condition in Proposition 2, there exists m V out such that
All the proofs of Corollary 1 and after are straightforward and will be omitted.
Inequality (5) implies that groups capable of e¤ectively monitoring and punishing its own members can successfully cooperate by expecting each other group to e¤ectively police its own transgressors to the extent that in-group policing does not require external threat. Such an inter-ethnic relation between tolerant groups is characterized by mutual trust: ethnic groups refrain from group-based reprisals as means 15 Suppose that groups are in the Pareto optimal equilibrium with m > 0. Given that each group I simultaneously and independently chooses its tolerance to the other group Q I after observing m A and m B , group I has no incentive to increase in Q I , because it destroys the incentive constraint (Inequality 4) in the other group. Also, group I does not want to decrease Q I ; because makes con ‡ict more likely.
for sustaining inter-ethnic social order. The equilibrium with e¢ cient monitoring corresponds to a case with c = :2 in Table 4 . However, even in cases with e¤ective in-group policing and large tolerance, threat of ethnic con ‡ict still needs to exist for urging costly monitoring in the other group. It is worth pointing out that threat of con ‡ict is intended not to directly discourage individual transgressions from the target group, rather to give an incentive for the group to costly monitor its members. In the absence of such threat (i.e., Q = k), there will be no reason to make costly e¤ort for monitoring, and as a result, inter-ethnic cooperation cannot be sustained. Our peer monitoring equilibrium with e¢ cient monitoring and high tolerance corresponds to Fearon and Laitin's (1996) in-group policing equilibrium, in which "individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other ethnic group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identi…ed and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren." 16 In contrast, the same argument cannot apply for groups incapable of e¤ective punishments (e.g., the case with c = :08 in Table 4 ). If groups are very tolerant, con ‡ict would be very unlikely regardless of a player's action. Knowing that, an individual might be more tempted to take a deviant behavior. If a group kindly tolerates the other group's wrongdoings as mistakes or misinterpretations, external threat of con ‡ict becomes impotent (Q 5 in Figure 1 ), and the tolerance may cause more deviant actions by destroying the incentive to conform. Thus, severe in-group punishment is required in order to maintain the incentive for out-group cooperation. However, the in-group policing is costly, and if the required cost for peer monitoring is higher than the bene…t from inter-ethnic cooperation, it is impossible to discipline its members (Q 4 with c = :08 in Figure 2) , and inter-ethnic cooperation breaks down. Therefore, for groups with ine¤ective in-group policing, tolerance may rather harm inter-ethnic cooperation, and occasional ethnic con ‡ict is unavoidable. These groups cannot ignore observed transgressions as misinterpretation since ignoring them may call for further transgressions, and therefore the groups must provoke con ‡ict for demonstrating that threats are in reality. 17 Such an equilibrium mainly sustained by external threats, corresponding to Fearon and Laitin's (1996) spiral equilibrium, is characterized by mutual mistrust: they are threatening each other in order to directly suppress transgressions from the target group.
From historical observation, Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century successfully reduced the socioeconomic antagonisms from nonJewish ones and alleviated their economic and social backwardness by reinforcing the social control on management of communal business and by promoting alliance among 16 In his autobiography, well-known 'Lawrence of Arabia' reported a lonely Arab man who was ostracized and cut o¤ from any friendly intercourse with his tribe, being penalized for murdering a Christian (Lawrence 1935:77-8) . This example seems to exactly …t the punishment of in-group policing equilibrium. I thank Dilip Mookherjee for pointing out this story. 17 A similar observation of competition and collusion in oligopolistic markets is theorized by Green and Porter (1984) . Table  4 . The …gure shows that if the tolerance is too low or too high, then it is unlikely that an intentional defection becomes pivotal to trigger ethnic con ‡ict, so that the external threat is not very e¤ective to induce out-group cooperation. Table 4 are shown. For c = :08, inter-ethnic cooperation is not sustainable with Q 4; because the monitoring cost exceeds the bene…t from it.
Jewish subgroups (Dumont 1982:229-30) . 18 This might be an example showing that strong in-group policing can enhance inter-ethnic cooperation.
Also, from a relatively recent event, although it is not about monitoring cost, the di¢ culty of in-group policing was often reported during Arafat's period of the Palestinian Authority. Under pressure from the United States, Russia and European countries, Arafat was faced with the dilemma of cracking down on some members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which was deeply unpopular among most Palestinians. 19 From the opposite side, the Netanyahu administration conditioned the progress of the Road Map for peace on the Palestinian Authority's ful…llment of obligations, including the cessation of terrorist attacks. The Sharon administration's demand includes the removal of the Palestine leader, Yasir Arafat, and strict limits on Palestinian security forces. 20 These policies look very much like the threat of external sanction for deterring transgressions in the target group. These examples suggest that the quality of in-group policing matters for inter-ethnic peaceful order and that a group without strong internal control may fail to avoid violent interactions with other groups.
Length of Ethnic Con ‡ict
The second observation is about the length of ethnic con ‡ict. Obviously, if ethnic con ‡ict is shorter, the damage caused by occasional con ‡ict also will be smaller in the presence with noise. On the other hand, shorter ethnic con ‡ict reduces the threat on the target group and requires more cost for in-group policing. Therefore, groups with high qualities of in-group policing can achieve inter-ethnic cooperation with shorter con ‡ict, whereas those with lower qualities may su¤er from longer struggles. Figure 3 shows per-period ex ante expected payo¤s of high-quality groups and of low-quality ones with the same parameter values as in Table 4 except giving various lengths of con ‡ict. For high-quality groups, the expected payo¤ is larger for higher tolerance Q and for shorter length of con ‡ict T out . Because in-group policing can be achieved very e¢ ciently, it does not have to rely on the threat from outside.
In contrast, for low-quality groups, the payo¤ is maximized at a medium range of tolerance Q, implying that inter-ethnic cooperation cannot be sustained either for too tolerant or too intolerant groups with low qualities of policing. Also, it can be seen that the longer period of con ‡ict T out achieves the larger expected payo¤, since it Figure 3 : It shows ex ante payo¤s from equilibria with two di¤erent monitoring e¢ ciencies (c = :2 and c = :08) and three di¤erent lengths of ethnic con ‡ict (T out = 1; 10; 100). Other parameter values are the same as in Table 4 . With ef…cient monitoring (c = :2), the equilibrium of shorter con ‡ict (T out = 1) gives a larger payo¤, whereas with ine¢ cient monitoring, the payo¤ is higher with longer con ‡ict (T out = 100). Especially, equilibrium cannot be sustained with c = :08 and T out = 1: (So, it does not apprear in the …gure.)
helps to save the monitoring cost. Especially, equilibrium cannot be sustained when the length is too short (T out = 1). These results predict that groups high qualities of in-group policing can successfully cooperate with each other by expecting autonomous sanctioning of culprits in the other group, whereas those with low qualities cannot eliminate the risk of collective violence and may su¤er from more frequent and longer disputes. Furthermore, the theory predicts that groups with even less qualities cannot construct social order due to the lack of policing regime.
Density of Network Between Groups
A change in the density of network between groups p = k n has various e¤ects on inter-ethnic cooperation and con ‡ict. First, if noise is present (" > 0), more frequent interactions between groups generate more defections by …rst-order stochastic domination of the random variable #D I , and ethnic con ‡ict may become more likely.
Proposition 3 Given other parameter values being equal and condition in Proposition 2 being satis…ed, an increase in frequency of out-group interactions relative to frequency of in-group interactions raises the probability of ethnic con ‡ict. This e¤ect is more severe if two groups are culturally more disparate.
Second, an increase in out-group network relative to in-group network reduces the power of in-group punishment. This makes the incentive for out-group cooperation harder to sustain. On the other hand, frequent interaction between groups may make inter-ethnic cooperation more attractive, making costly monitoring worthwhile. (Mathematically, it alleviates the condition m V out in Proposition 2.) In total, the impact of a change in the density of out-group network on inter-ethnic cooperation is ambiguous, depending on each group's quality of policing. But given all else equal, Proposition 3 implies that a dense network tends to harm cooperation if groups are far disparate. Both directions of e¤ects by the change in the density of out-group network were reported from historical evidences and empirical …ndings.
A striking example was reported from Turkey. From a study of inter-ethnic interactions of Turkish-Kurdish case and Turkish-Laz case, Oztalas (2006) claimed that modernization increases the probability of ethnic con ‡ict and war only if it combined with other factors such as strong ethnic prejudice, extremist elite mobilization, exclusionary system or the security dilemma. Taking into account that modernization here represents migration and urbanization which are likely to facilitate inter-ethnic interactions, this report would support the prediction of our theory that frequent inter-ethnic interaction may increase the likelihood of ethnic con ‡ict if ethnic groups are culturally disparate or intolerant toward each other.
In addition, it was reported from the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire that due to isolation or separation from other local habitants, Jewish and Gypsy merchants were often collectively accused of local incidents. It implies that the lack of strong network between groups harms inter-ethnic cooperation. According to Dumont (1982:223) , "[w]hen some incident occurs in a locality, the scapegoat was always the same: the accusations were directed at a band of Gypsies or a Jewish ragpicker who had wandered through sometime earlier." Moreover, "numerous anti-Jewish riots were accompanied by boycott. As soon as some trouble occurred, Christians forbade Jews access to their quarters and stopped trading with Jewish bazaar merchants." 21 However, it can also be interpreted that the lack of strong network makes communication between groups more di¢ cult and misinterpretation more likely. If so, the possibility of misinterpretations " might be negatively associated with the density of out-group network p. This is out of the scope of our theory.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a new cause of ethnic con ‡ict which is missing in existing theories: lack of in-group policing. Inter-ethnic transgression may provoke indiscriminate vengeance for asking collective liability in the target group. Under the threat of such communal violence, people are induced to deter coethnics'deviant behaviors against outsiders through mutual monitoring and controlling. In our model, interethnic social order is enforced by in-group policing and out-group con ‡ict, but the former is induced by threat of the latter. Each group relies on the other group's internal policing, because peers are in a good position for monitoring and punishing potential wrongdoers. This pattern of ethnic con ‡ict is widely observed in anthropological and historical literature. Our theory is in contrast to the existing one (Fearon and Laitin 1996) which considers that in-group policing and con ‡ict are mutually independent and that the main cause of ethnic con ‡ict is the anonymity of culprits.
As a logical consequence of our mechanism of inter-ethnic cooperation, each group's quality of in-group policing matters for the likelihood and the duration of ethnic con ‡ict. To be precise, groups with high qualities of policing could successfully maintain inter-ethnic cooperation, whereas those with low qualities have to bear more frequent and longer disputes. If a group cannot e¤ectively suppress its members' wrongdoings, ethnic con ‡ict might be inevitable.
Our model gives two other predictions from comparative statics. First, the dense network between groups may help or harm inter-ethnic cooperation, depending on how culturally disparate two groups are. Frequent interactions between groups may provoke ethnic con ‡ict if groups are far disparate, whereas it can help for inter-ethnic social order between groups with less cultural disparity.
Second, although inter-ethnic tolerance facilitates cooperation between groups if 21 In contrast, two recent studies suggest that what Putnam (2000) labeled "bridging" social capital may enhance mutual trust and reduce antagonisms toward each other. First, using data from two minority regions of Russia, Bahry et al. (2005) found that trusts on ethnic strangers decline with social and physical distance. Second, with data from the 1992-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and from 1990 Census (both of which are of the U.S.), tests by Oliver and Wong (2003) suggest that ethnic spatial and social isolation bolster negative out-group perceptions.
they can e¤ectively police their own members, tolerance may lead to inter-ethnic transgressions if they are not very capable of policing members. It is because the incentive to conform will be eroded if groups are too tolerant toward each other.
Finally, we discuss an agenda for future research. Although we do not assume any centralized formal institution in the model, it may have a local formal institution or authority in each ethnic group. Especially if costly monitoring involves free-rider problem, the need for formal institution is more signi…cant for larger ethnic groups. For such a local authority, the political decision making process of in-group policing and of out-group tolerance may matter for inter-ethnic peace. As implied by the dilemma Arafat faced, it is not straight-forward to make these policies if people in a group have di¤erent propensities to peace and con ‡ict. All of these ideas are abstracted from the model. On the other hand, local authority may not be required if the size of ethnic group is relatively small. However, it still matters in a small group how information about peers'actions is truthfully revealed and correctly transmitted to all the members. We assumed that such information becomes common knowledge among peers once it is revealed, but the information transmission is not immediate since anyone who committed a crime always has incentives to oppose the revealed fact, and in addition, the information is not necessarily veri…able for third parties. It is not clear how informal institution gives enough incentives for sharing the information among members. For both formal and informal institutions, the detailed mechanism of in-group policing is not yet theoretically explained.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.
22
Because of the homogeneity of individuals and the symmetry of groups, it su¢ ces, without loss of generality, to show that incentive constraints hold for individual i of group I after any history. Also, by the optimality principle of dynamic programming, it is su¢ cient to check that one-shot deviations are unpro…table in any state (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991:108-10) .
Before proceeding the proof, de…ne the system of states as s t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t n ); where t 0 denotes the number of periods remaining in the con ‡ict phase, and t i for i = 1; : : : ; n denotes the number of periods remaining in individual i's punishment phase. Individual i is in the normal phase when t i = 0, and the state is in the peace phase when t 0 = 0. We call an individual in the normal phase "cooperator" and one in the punishment phase "defector." Also, let n t+l be the number of cooperators except i in I in period t + l , and q t+l = n t+l n 1 be the probability that player i is paired with a cooperator in period t + l if i is paired in-group.
(i) For 1 to form a SPNE, all the incentive constraints must be satis…ed in all the states s t ; a cooperator i (t i = 0) has no incentive (1-1a) to cooperate with an in-group defector, (1-1b) to defect against an in-group cooperator, and (1-1c) to cooperate with an out-group player; as well as a defector i (t i > 0) has no incentive (1-2a) to cooperate with an in-group defector, (1-2b) to defect against an in-group cooperator, (1-2c) to cooperate with an out-group player. Since it is immediate that cases 1-1a, -1c, -2a and -2c are satis…ed for any s t , we con…ne attention to conditions for 1-1b and -2b.
For 1-1b, if an individual defects, he will gain the additional payo¤ of 1 in the current period, while the expected loss will be P T in l=1 l (1 p) (q t+l (1 + ) + (1 q t+l ) ) ; where 1 + = 1 ( ) is the loss if he is paired with a cooperator and is the loss if i is paired with a defector. Thus, the incentive constraint for 1-1b is
This constraint must hold for any possible q t+l ; and it is most restrictive when the loss is minimized. If > 1 + ; the loss is minimized by q t+l = 1 for 1 l T in . On the other hand, if 1 + , the loss is minimized by q t+l = 0 for 1 l T in 1 and q t+T in = 1: (It is because if all players j 6 = i follow 1 , no one is in the punishment phase at states with t i = 1:) Therefore, Constraint 1-1b can be shown as
For 1-2b, the gain from the deviation is while i loses the payo¤ of
by the deviation at states with t i : The incentive constraint for 1-2b is
, which must be satis…ed for any t i > 0. The loss is minimized when i is in the …rst period of the punishment phase (t i = T in ) ; and for the same reason as above, it must be that q t+T in = 1. Thus, Constraint 1-2b can be reduced to
The condition p <
1+
comes from Constraint 1-2b with < 1. For 1 + , Constraint 1-2b is su¢ cient for 1-1b, and it is most relaxed when T in = 1.
(ii) In addition to the constraints in 1 , 2 requires the constraint for out-group cooperation. I.e., a player i; regardless of t i , has no incentive (2-1d,2d) to defect against an outsider when t 0 = 0. The bene…t from the deviation is 1, and the loss is p P T out t=1 t . Constraint 2-1d,2d is
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. For the strategy pro…le 3 to constitute a SPNE, in addition to constraints for in-group pairings in 1 , the following constraints must hold for outgroup pairings: a cooperator i (t i = 0) has no incentive (3-1c) to cooperate if t 0 > 0; (3-1d) to defect if t 0 = 0; and a defector i (t i > 0) has no incentive (3-2c) to cooperate if t 0 > 0; (3-2d) to defect if t 0 = 0. Since 3-1c and -2c are trivially satis…ed, let us focus on 3-1d and -2d. For 3-1d, the bene…t from the deviation is 1, and the loss comes from ethnic con ‡ict P T out t=1 t p and from collective peer punishment. A player i's defection against an outsider sends into the punishment phase not only i, but also other k 1 peers who matched with outsiders when i defected. This change in other peers'status also a¤ects i's expected payo¤ when i defected. The e¤ect of i's defection on his peers will be at least (a) that the number of those in the punishment phase increases by k 1 only in the last period of the punishment phase (t i = 1), which happens if all n 1 others entered the punishment phase just one period before i had defected; and at most (b) that the number of the punished rises by k 1 for every period of i's punishment phase (1 t i T in ), which happens if all n 1 others are in the normal phase when i defected.
In case 3-1d (a), if i defects, i's expected payo¤s from each of future in-group matches will be zero for the …rst T in 1 periods of the punishment phase (2 t i T in ) and
at the last period (t i = 1) (
shows the probability to match with a peer in the normal phase), whereas he could enjoy payo¤s of for 2 t i T For 3-2d, the bene…t from the deviation is 1, and the loss comes both from collective peer punishment and ethnic con ‡ict. As 1-2b in Lemma 1, the loss is minimized when t i = T in : The e¤ect of i's defection on his peers is at least (a) and at most (b) shown above. In case (a), the defection does not change i's payo¤s for 2 t i T in ; and it creates the loss of 1 + n k n 1 at t i = 1. In case (b), the defection increases i's payo¤s by k 1 n 1 for each period during 2 t i T in (since the defection sends other k 1 peers into the punishment phase, weakening the punishment on i) and decreases by 1 + n k n 1 at t i = 1. So, the constraint in case (b) is more restrictive than in case (a). Constraint 3-2d will be I T in > 1 1
which su¢ ces Constraint 3-1d since the …rst term of the LHS is non-positive. Constraint 3-2d is most relaxed when T in = 1. So, as in Lemma 1, it is possible to take T in = 1 for 1 + . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. For the strategy pro…le 4 to constitute a SPNE, the following two constraints 4-1d and 4-2d must hold, instead of 3-1d and 3-2d in 3 .
The constraint for a cooperator in out-group matches (4-1d) requires r (m)
T in X t=1 t (1 p) (q t+l (1 + ) + (1 q t+l ) ) + 1
For a defector to cooperate in out-group matches, because the loss of r (m) P T in l=t i l (1 p) (q t+l (1 + ) + (1 q t+l ) ) + P T out t=1 t p is minimized when t i = T in and q t+T in = 1 by the same way as in 1-2b, the constraint for 4-2d is r (m) T in (1 p) (1 + ) + 1
which is su¢ cient for 4-1d. For out-group cooperation to be bene…cial to each group, it must be that m p.
Q.E.D.
Ex ante expected payo¤ s.
For 5 , let the per-period ex ante expected payo¤ V 5 be divided into the one from the one in-group matches (1 p) and the other from out-group matches V out (V 5 = (1 p) +V out ). The ex ante out-group payo¤ (not per-period averaged) can be shown asV out = p [(1 ") " ] + (F k (Q)
T outV out ). So, the per-period out-group payo¤ is
For 6 , let the per-period ex ante expected payo¤ be V 6 = V in 6 + V out , and letV in 6
denote the ex ante in-group payo¤ (not per-period averaged). We consider three cases of preserving peace and entering con ‡ict: (x) ethnic con ‡ict is triggered by group I (#D I > Q), (y) con ‡ict is triggered only by J (#D J > Q and #D I Q), (z) the peace phase is preserved (maxf#D I ; #D J g Q).
In case (x), i's continuation payo¤ from the next period and after will be (1 p) f(1 p)
, in which he receives per-period in-group payo¤ of
if he matched with a peer in the last period (that happens with probability 1 p); while his per-period in-group payo¤ is n 1 (k 1) n 1 ( ) if he matched with an outsider in the last period (that happens with probability p). In case (y), i's continuation payo¤ from the next period and after will be P T out t=1 t (1 p) + T out +1V in 6 . In case (z), his continuation payo¤ from the next and after will be V in 6 . By using facts that cases (x), (y) and (z) happen with probabilities 1 F k (Q) ; F k (Q) (1 F k (Q)) and F k (Q) 2 ; respectively, the ex ante in-group payo¤ can be shown asV 
]
+F k (Q) (1 F k (Q)) 1 ; (1 p) (1 + ) maxf 1; g; and
(ii) For 6 to be a SPNE, Inequality (A1) is replaced by
Proof of Lemma 3. Because the incentive constraints for in-group cooperation are the same as in cases without noise, we will focus on constraints for out-group interactions.
(i) For 5 , the per-period ex ante payo¤ from out-group interactions is V out if a player chooses to cooperate with an outsider, whereas it is zero during the con ‡ict phase. Thus, Constraints 2-1d,2d of 2 is replaced by the following constraint 5-1d,2d
where (F k (Q) F k 1 (Q 1)) F k (Q) shows the change in probability of ethnic con‡ict caused by an intentional out-group defection.
(ii) For 6 , we consider incentive constraints for out-group cooperation if player i is in the normal phase (6-1d) and if i is in the punishment phase (6-2d). For 6-1d, (x') if group I triggers con ‡ict, i's continuation payo¤ from the next period and after will be (1 p) n k n 1 ( ) + P T out t=2 t (1 p) + T out +1V in 6 ; which di¤ers from the continuation payo¤ in (x), because unlike in (x), it is already revealed that i matched with an outsider. The continuation payo¤s for cases that con ‡ict is triggered only by the other group J 6 = I and that the peace phase is preserved are the same as those of (y) and of (z) above. If i deviates, probabilities of cases (x'), (y) and (z) change to 1 F k 1 (Q 1) ; F k 1 (Q 1) (1 F k (Q)) and F k 1 (Q 1) F k (Q) ; respectively.
